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Abstract
In this paper we revisit three hypotheses, which we had pro-
posed before, in an attempt to explain the long-run pattern
of Argentine real GDP growth: (i) distributional conflicts
(between the government and the private sector, and between
entrepreneurs and trade unions), (ii) a permissive monetary
policy, and (iii) the delinking of the Argentine economy
from the world markets. Applying unit root econometrics we
determine that the model is not cointegrated and that it
should be estimated with conventional methods in difference
form. Alternative estimates . indicate that the best fit is
achieved by a model representing hypotheses (i) and (ii) but
not (iii). Thus, foreign trade seems not to have had any
impact on Argentine GDP during the period studied. Also, the
conflict between entrepreneurs and trade unions does not
seem to have had an important influence on Argentine growth,
at least in the period 1915 - 1978. However, the results for
the extended period 1915 - 1988 indicate that our model re-
presenting hypotheses (i) and (ii) does not perform well in
explaining the 1980s, when substantial changes in economic
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Some years ago, in an enquiry into the long-run pattern of
Argentine growth we put forward some hypotheses and empiri-
cally assessed their relative explanatory power [Foders,
Glismann 1985, 1987]. An important part of that evidence was
based on the assumption that our key variables could be sta-
tistically described as following a linear deterministic
trend, and that the impact of economic policies on aggregate
macroeconomic variables could be studied by analysing the
cycles presented by the deviations of the series about their
long-run trend. Regressing the level of real GDP on the
levels of the proxies for our hypotheses and applying stan-
dard econometric wisdom we found support for the picture de-
rived from closely scrutinising the cycles shown by the de-
trended series. However, since the multiple regression show-
ed a rather high R and significant t-values but a low Dur-
bin-Watson statistic, the suspicion arises that our results
might have been of the "spurious" kind [Granger, Newbold
1974]. Recent advances in econometric theory and in the em-
pirical analysis of time series have established that spu-
rious regressions may occur if the time series involved are
non stationary, i. e. if they have stochastic components or
unit roots [Granger 1986; Hendry 1986; Stock, Watson 1988].
In the presence of unit roots standard asymptotic theory
does not apply and regression analysis involving t;he levels
of variables can be highly misleading. In this paper we ad-
dress long-run Argentine economic growth drawing heavily on
these new developments in econometric theory and time series
analysis.
The appropriate procedure under the unit root assumption
is to determine whether the series are cointegrated. A
model consisting of cointegrated variables can be best
estimated using a dynamic specification approach (for ex-
ample, an error correction model). Not cointegrated vari-
ables call instead for an estimation in difference form
applying traditional methods.- 2 -
In spite of the fact that the short-run analysis of Argen-
tina's economic performance dominates the literature , Ar-
gentina's economic decline seems to be the outcome of a ra-
ther chronic disease. According to Table 1, real GDP growth
has been slowing down over a period of 75 years; the same
applies to total productivity growth (or to the growth of
real GDP per capita). The average ratio of investment to GDP
was 50 per cent lower in 1951 - 1989 than in the period 1900
- 1913; the openness of the country (as measured by the ra-
tio of imports plus exports to GDP) fell dramatically from
1864 - 1913 to 1951 - 1989. Argentina's growth pattern dif-
fers from the one experienced by comparable countries in
that the growth rates it achieved this century were not only
much lower than the ones achieved in the second half of the
19th century, but also lower than the rates experienced by
other Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico) [Diaz-Ale-
jandro 1982].
What is Argentina's growth paradox all about? It is widely
acknowledged that Argentina's endowment with factors of pro-
duction has more similarities with industrial countries than
with most developing countries. This applies particularly to
the supply of qualified labour, as can be inferred, for in-
stance, from the national enrollment share in higher educa-
tion, which comes near to the level of Southern Europe
[World Bank]. Since Argentina is well-endowed with tradi-
tional energy resources (oil, gas, coal, uranium), the coun-
try was not severely hit during the oil price hikes of the
1970s. Also, population growth never was a problem. More-
over, the inflow of human and financial capital remained im-
portant until well into the 1960s. Argentina's comparative
advantage in the production of agricultural products, de-
See, for instance, the attention given to the "Tablita"
and to other short-run stabilisation plans ("Plan Aus-
tral") by World Development [1985] and Blejer, Cheasty
[1988] .- 3 -
Table 1 - Argentina: Real Growth, Investment, Productivity

























Exponential annual average rate of growth of real GDP
(prices of 1960) in per cent;
exponential annual average rate of growth of real GDP per
capita (prices of 1960) in per cent (1869 - 1913);
ratio of gross real investment to real GDP (prices of
1960) in per cent (1900 - 1913);
ratio of (real) imports plus (real) exports to real GDP
(prices of 1960) in per cent.
Source: Own calculations with data from sources listed under
"References"'.
rived from the availability of fertile land and a beneficial
climate, was, for many years, a reliable source of foreign
exchange, at least until mounting protectionism in foreign
markets (United States, European Community) reduced the de-
mand for Argentine agricultural products. With these assets
in mind, one would have expected high growth rates of out-
put. In view of the Argentine growth puzzle it is surprising
to find that the profession appears to have lost its inter-
est in comprehensive studies of long-run relationships in
the vein of the ones published by Laura Randall [1978] and
Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro [1970, 1982].- 4 -
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the empirical
analysis of the long-term economic growth of Argentina. In
Section II some of the hypotheses already put forward else-
where [Foders, Glismann 1985, 1987] are reviewed and in Sec-
tion III they are tested applying unit root methods. In the
last section we contrast our findings and policy conclusions
with the economic reforms currently underway in Argentina.
II. Hypotheses Explaining the Long-Run Pattern of Argentine
Development
1. Distributional Conflicts
The distributional conflicts hypothesis refers to the out-
come of the struggle of different social groups to secure an
increasing share of national income for themselves. The key
players are the government bureaucracy, the trade unions and
the entrepreneurs. The theory of public choice offers sever-
al (positive) approaches to the role of such social groups
in the economic process [Olson 1982]. The essence of this
theory is that rent seeking by these groups leads to a re-
allocation of productive factors away from profitable in-
vestment and towards private consumption and government ex-
penditure. The hypothesis that variations in long-term
growth observed in industrial countries could be associated
with variations in the intensity of distributional conflicts
has been invoked to explain the growth pattern of Germany
[Glismann, Rodemer, Wolter 1978] .
In the case of Argentina, two different conflicts can be
distinguished: the one arising between unions and entre-
preneurs, and the one arising between the government and the
private productive sector. Ceteris paribus, every distri-
butional conflict can be considered to be a zero-sum game,
with improvements in the position of one side costing the- 5 -
other side a loss. For example, wage hikes which are out of
line with productivity growth are likely to lower the pro-
fitability of capital investment. Lower profits affect in-
vestment, and this, in turn, might affect employment; in the
end GDP increases could be smaller, thereby offering new
incentives for the next round of distributional conflicts.
Similarly, a substantial expansion of government activity in
the economy, for instance, by nationalising private firms,
could lead to a monopoly position of government-owned firms
in the corresponding domestic markets and thus to lower
growth rates of the affected industries. This would ulti-
mately reduce the overall rate of economic growth, parti-
cularly if private industry is crowded out by government-
owned firms in the market for private goods.
The first class of distributional conflicts, the one between
trade unions and entrepreneurs, has a prominent place in
Argentine history. Together with immigration from Europe the
idea of unionisation reached the country already in the
first half of the 19th. century. Industrialisation and the
increasing concentration of workers in the main cities par-
ticularly after World War I favoured the development of
unions. Since the 1940s worker's organisations began to in-
crease their power, when the establishment of a virtually
closed shop system lead to a growing membership. Accumulat-
ing membership fees, which were centrally administered,
Argentine unions turned first into an economic and then into
a political factor. Their power matched quite well the eco-
nomic and political power accruing to entrepreneurs.
The second type of conflict also occurred repeatedly in Ar-
gentina, both before and after the rise to power of Peronism
in the 1940s. The ownership structure of Argentine industry
was clearly biased towards foreign capital, because most
capital and entrepreneurial talent had come from abroad.
Foreign companies had contributed to the very dynamic eco-- 6 -
nomic development of the country after the independence from
Spain in 1810 and were engaged in international trade and
banking but also in the local production of both public and
private goods and services. In the 1930s and 1940s nationa-
lism, the dominant political movement in continental Europe
at that time, also governed Argentine politics. This lead to
the nationalisation of many British and American firms hold-
ing monopoly interests in the key sectors of the Argentine
economy [Randall 1978] and, thus, to a dominant position of
state firms.
Peronism also changed labour relations. Being the party of
"Social Justice", the Peronist party used income distribu-
tion as an instrument to enhance its popularity and, hence,
increase the number of votes. The Peronist government on the
one hand directly influenced wage negotiations in favour of
the unions and on the other offered entrepreneurs (private
and state firms) a "safe" domestic market by introducing
tariff and non-tariff barriers to international trade and
maintaining an overvalued exchange rate for "cheap" imports
of capital goods and intermediate products. Price controls
for agricultural commodities and foodstuffs (= wage goods)
artificially maintained a high purchasing power of money in-
come; real wages increased.
The pattern of investment (Table 1) could be interpreted as
revealing that at least from the World War I to the late
1950s (not less than 40 years of Argentine economic history)
an increasing share of real income was used for other pur-
poses, notably for consumption. At its lower average level
(21 - 24 per cent from 1914 to 1989) investment never lead
to a recovery of GDP. This seems to indicate that the natur-
al conflict between savings and consumption, which can be
related to the time preference of the leading social groups,
was decided in favour of the latter, a fact that is support-
ed by the downturn in productivity experienced during the
period under study.- 7 -
2. A Permissive Monetary Policy
This hypothesis deals with the transmission mechanism from
monetary policy to the real sector of the economy via the
impact of monetary policy on prices [von Mises 1953, Fried-
man 1977]. It particularly highlights the effects of mone-
tary policy on the relative prices of goods, services and
factors of production. Since under high and variable rates
of inflation the informational content of (relative) prices
is lost, entrepreneurs find it increasingly difficult to
allocate their capital to the most profitable uses.
Argentina's monetary history can be divided into two periods
according to the prevailing standard, gold and the US dol-
lar. Until 1875 there was no monopoly for the emission of
money; several private banks had the right to mint gold and
silver coins. In 1875 the (spontaneous) system of parallel
currencies came to an end, when the government set a fixed
ratio between both metals. Eight years later, the gold stan-
dard was introduced, hoping that it would help to control
the money supply. This did not happen, however, and only two
years later the external convertibility of the domestic cur-
rency had to be temporarily suspended for most international
transactions. Convertibility was again restricted during the
so-called Baring crisis in 1890/91 [Bernholz 1984] and again
from 1914 to 1927. Finally, in 1931 the US dollar was chosen
as the new standard for the local currency and in 1935 the
Argentine central bank was founded, at first as a private
bank. These developments did not help to control the money
supply either. Instead, they paved the way for an expansion
of government expenditure at exorbitant rates.
Several monetary measures contributed to a policy of soft
budget restriction. From 1946 to 1957 and later from 1973 to
1976 the government nationalised bank deposits. This is
tantamount to having a 100 per cent reserve requirement in a- 8 -
fractional reserve system. Monetary expansion at first was
limited to 25 per cent of gold and foreign currency re-
serves. From 1949 onwards this ceiling was relaxed until a
fractional reserve system was formally introduced in 1957.
But this system with its much better means to control at
least a part of the money supply also failed. The central
bank became an instrument of fiscal and income policies. The
first major increase in the supply of money happened during
the 1930s; the 1940s and 1950s saw a virtual explosion of
the money supply. Inflation became a problem: annual changes
in the consumer price index in the order of 20 per cent were
common in the 1950s; the 1970s and 1980s saw three to four-
digit rates per annum.
3. Disintegration
The disintegration hypothesis is the reverse of the well-
known gains-from-trade hypothesis derived from classical and
neoclassical international trade theory [Haberler 1936; Hel-
ler 1968]: to close the economy to international trade is to
give away the potential gains from foreign trade. If the
gains from no trade exceed the gains from trade, the closed
economy will experience higher rates of growth of real in-
come than the open economy. Foreign trade constituted the
single major sector of the Argentine economy in the 19th
century. Exports alone reached a level of about 40 per cent
of GDP in 1870; imports amounted to some 30 per cent. A high
degree of foreign trade dependence is not only obvious in
the light of the relatively small domestic market existing
at that time. It also shows that Argentina adhered to the
law of one price in the sense that the country was fully
integrated into the world economy. However, the strengths of
integration have to be contrasted with the risks implied by
the high commodity and regional concentration of trade flows
and the high regional concentration of capital flows: from
independence (1810) to World War II Britain was the single- 9 -
most important customer for Argentine (mainly agricultural)
products. In the interwar years the US began to absorb an
increasing share of Argentine exports; in the past 40 years
the US became the most important market for Argentine pro-
ducts. The same regions were also the most important sources
of Argentine commodity (mainly manufactures), financial ca-
pital and technology imports.
Since foreign economic relations appear to have been central
to Argentine economic development, it is plausible to assume
that external shocks in form of wars and other (unexpected)
interruptions of world trade and capital flows should have
had an impact on the economic performance of this country.
Even if the empirical evidence showing potential welfare
losses for Argentina derived from the extreme dependence on
international trade and capital flows is missing, what ulti-
mately counts is the policy reaction to this perceived ex-
posure. The expectations of Argentine policymakers in this
century can be safely said to have been deeply influenced by
the alleged weakness of being dependent on foreign trade. It
is thus not surprising that already in the 1930s import sub-
stitution turned into a "leitmotiv" of Argentine economic
policy. By closing the economy policymakers traded the risk
of being severely hit by uncontrollable events originating
in the world market for another risk, the risk of implement-
ing a development strategy against the country's static com-
parative advantage. Since the latter determined the coun-
try's traditional role in the international division of la-
bour, the strategy of import substitution involved a radical
departure from this role and hence from Argentina's integra-
tion into the world market.
It can be inferred from Table 1 that Argentina's path went
from integration to disintegration. As shown in our 1985
paper, the period of integration was very short: it lasted
from 1864 to 1890, when disintegration began. In 1870 im-- 10 -
ports and exports together amounted to about 70 per cent of
GDP; this ratio fell to 40 per cent in 1891 and remained
under 30 per cent from 1930 to 1970; in the 1970s and 1980s
this indicator hardly ever rose over 20 per cent. Interest-
ingly, both World Wars seem to have been periods of increa-
sing integration, in contrast to the interwar years (Great
Depression). This obviously weakens the hypothesis of ex-
ternal vulnerability in the face of events with a potential
impact on global trade.
If the openness of the country was a factor in Argentine
economic history, slow growth may have been the price for
delinking the Argentine economy from the world market. While
the country might have deliberately pursued autarky policies
after 1930, when excessive import substitution policies were
introduced, why did the country begin to retire from world
markets as early as 1890?. Trade problems with the UK could
have been one motive, although most of the problems came
much later, in the wake of the consolidation of the British
Commonwealth in the 1920s. The Roca-Runciman-Treaty (1933
and again 1936) kept Argentine exports flowing into the
British market for a while, in spite of the fact that Argen-
tina was not accepted as a Commonwealth member.
III. The Model, Data Pre-Analysis and Empirical Results
1. The Model
The basic empirical model incorporating proxies for the
hypotheses presented in the last section can be written as
(1) GDP = GDP (INV, AST, MX/GDP, CPI, RWP)- 11 -
where
GDP = real gross domestic product (in prices of 1960)
INV = real gross investment (in prices of 1960)
AST = real government expenditure (in prices of 1960)
MX/GDP = imports plus exports (as a per cent of GDP; in
prices of 1960)
CPI = consumer price index (1960 = 100)
RWP = real wage position (wage: productivity ratio; in
prices of 1960) .
INV, AST and RWP represent the distributional conflicts hy-
pothesis, CPI the monetary policy hypothesis, and MX/GDP the
disintegration hypothesis. AST addresses the conflict bet-
ween the government and the private sector and RWP the one
between entrepreneurs and trade unions. In a society engaged
in distributional conflicts, i. e. showing a time preference
between consumption and savings favouring the former, the
potential level of savings decreases and, in the absence of
foreign savings, investment too (INV). The signs found under
the independent variables in (1) follow from the discussion
in the last section: an increase in investment (INV) and
trade (MX/GDP) is assumed to have a positive impact on out-
put, whereas increases in government spending, the level of
prices, and the wage: productivity ratio can be expected to
have a negative impact.
Hoping to benefit from new developments in econometrics, in
this paper we. first set out to subject our time series to a
pre-analysis in order to try to identify (or at least to
better approximate) the underlying data-generating process.
We scrutinise the sample autocorrelation estimates of the
relevant variables and subsequently embark on a formal unit
root test. We then perform a multivariate cointegration test
in order to derive the appropriate estimation procedure.- 12 -
2. Data Pre-Analysis
a. Autocorrelation Estimates
A pre-analysis of our time series based on the Chi-square
distributed Box-Pierce Q-statistic (at lag 20) and the stan-
dard error of the sample autocorrelation function (at lag
20) yields the characteristics summarised in the second co-
lumn of Table 2. This exercise includes the ratios used in
our 1985 and 1987 papers (INV/GDP, AST/GDP), and the series
present in RWP (REL and PROD). According to the Q statistic
alone, AST, INV/GDP, AST/GDP, and CPI seem to be borderline
cases. While INV/GDP is found to be stationary in the first
and second differences, CPI appears to be stationary in any
of the three forms studied (the original time series, and
first and second differences). AST and AST/GDP, both present
a non-stationary structure. These results clearly point to-
ward the limited applicability of the Q-statistic, probably
due to the fact, that its assumed distribution as Chi-square
is only an approximation for large samples. Since it is also
known that stationary series are defined as featuring a par-
ticular sample autocorrelation function which falls off ra-
ther quickly as the number of lags increases, casual obser-
vation of these functions can be used as a further criterion
to determine whether a particular time series was generated
by a white noise process. We conclude from Table Al that
AST, INV/GDP and AST/GDP are stationary in first differ-
ences, and that CPI is stationary in second differences.
b. Unit Root Test
Performing a unit root test on the same data yields the re-
We regressed the first difference of the natural log of
each series on the lagged value of the undifferenced log
and alternatively included deterministic components and
lagged values of the dependent variable (Tables A2
All) .Bibliofhek
des Institute fur Weltwirtschaf"
- 13 -
Table 2 - Identification of the Data Generating Process
Underlying the Data Set














GDP: real gross domestic product; INV: real gross invest-
ment; AST: real government expenditure; INV/GDP: invest-
ment ratio; AST/GDP: government expenditure ratio; CPI:
consumer price index; REL: real wage index; PROD: real GDP
per capita; RWP: real wage as per cent of PROD; MX/GDP:
exports and imports as per cent of GDP; FD: first differ-
enced series is stationary; SD: second differenced series
is stationary; 1(1): difference stationary (first order);
1(2): difference stationary (second order).
Source: Own calculations.
suits also summarised in Table 2, column three. The formal
test generally confirms the autocorrelation analysis for the
whole set of variables. As usual, though, in some cases the
test is ambiguous, a fact that is no surprise, for, as re-
cently noted by Cochrane [1991], and also by Campbell and
Perron [1991], tests for unit roots have low.power in the
sample sizes typically available for economic time series.
It consequently turns out to be virtually impossible to
clearly distinguish whether a series is difference-statio-
nary or trend-stationary. This can be readily seen from
Table A3, for example. While the results for INV indicate- 14 -
that the hypothesis that this time series is integrated of
second order (1(2)) can be rejected for every subcase at the
10 per cent significance level, the rejection of the hypo-
thesis that INV is 1(1) depends on the specification of the
regression: it cannot be rejected in the subcases la, b, c;
2a, c; 3a, b, c and 4a, b, c. In the subcase 2b it can be
rejected in favour of 1(0). Similarly, AST (Table A4) ap-
pears to be 1(0) in the subcase 2a; the ratios in Tables A5
and All also alternate between 1(0) and 1(1). These results
underline the importance of both (i) correctly modeling the
deterministic components of a time series and (ii) including
or not a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of
the estimated equation. For "any trend-stationary process
can be approximated arbitrarily well by a unit root process"
and vice versa [Campbell, Perron 1991, pp. 18 - 19]. Tables
A2 - All reveal that by specifying a fairly wide array of
deterministic components, the series can vary substantially
in their demeaned and detrended behaviour as well as in
their reaction to lagged dependent variables.
As far as GDP is concerned, the Dickey-Fuller test cannot
reject the null hypothesis over most of the specification
scenarios chosen, as long as the order of the trend poly-
nomial remains under four. Thus, in this case, the well-
known phenomenon of "near observational equivalence" between
trend stationary and difference stationary series shows up
only from trend polynomials of order four onwards, where the
null must be rejected. In deciding whether a series is 1(0),
1(1) or 1(2) we assumed the specification featuring a con-
stant and a linear trend to be the crucial one, because it
nests both the null hypothesis of a unit root and the alter-
native hypothesis that the series is trend stationary.
This method has been called "identifying the breaking
point of deterministic complexity" (Paque 1991,
pp. 22-27). In contrast to Paque's findings for German
wage data, we do not detect a common breaking point.- 15 -
In sum, the unit root test yields that our real variables
(GDP, INV, AST, RED and ratios (AST/GDP, INV/GDP, MX/GDP,
RWP, PROD) all appear to be 1(1) and that our only "nominal"
series, CPI, is 1(2). This means that in nominal terms GDP,
INV, AST, MX, and REL should also be 1(2). If these assump-
tions hold, our findings for Argentine time series are in
line with the findings of other authors for other countries,
particularly in the case of GDP and CPI [Campbell, Perron
1991, p. 56].
3. Cointegration Test
We now embark on a cointegration test, i. e. on finding out
empirically whether a linear combination of the time series
in our data set exists, which (i) is stationary (1(0)), (ii)
eliminates the unit roots, and (iii) might have a linear
trend. The aim is to test for stochastic integration, a
somewhat weaker form of cointegration which is compatible
with the existence of deterministic components in the data
[Campbell, Perron 1991, p. 25]. For this we use a residual-
based test which amounts to a unit root test on the errors
of a static equation including a constant and a linear
trend. The null hypothesis is the one of no cointegration,
the alternative hypothesis the one of stochastic cointe-
gration.
In the last section, a univariate unit root test revealed
that with only one exeption (CPI) we were not able to reject
the hypothesis that the time series in our data set are
1(1). Since CPI appears to be 1(2), this variable should
enter the cointegrating regression in first differences, due
to the requirement that all specified variables be inte-
grated of the same order. In fact, here the unit root test
matches the prior given by economic theory, that the change
In fact, series with a lower order of integration (i. e.
1(0) could be present [Campbell, Perron 1991, p. 25].- 16 -
in the price, i. e. the rate of inflation, is the correct
specification.
As can be seen from Table 3 we estimated the static equation
for two periods: 1915 - 1978 and 1915 - 1988. The first
period coincides with the period for which we presented the
results in our 1985 paper. A Chow test for splitting the
sample into the subperiods 1915 - 1978 and 1979 - 1988 indi-
cates that the coefficients are unstable over the longer
period. This could point towards a change in the policy
regime. In the 1980s Argentina experienced important shocks
and deep institutional changes with an impact on the eco-
nomic regime: the war in the South Atlantic, the return to
democracy and civilian government, heterodox stabilisation
plans etc.
The static regression reveals that in both periods the ex-
pectations pertaining to the signs of the variables were not
met. A higher DW statistic in the shorter period is not an
encouraging indicator of superiority. Invoking further test
statistics, as the Breusch/Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test
in its both forms AR/MA(1) and AR/MA(2), and the Ljung/Box
statistic (1 and 2 lags), as reported in Table 3, the
picture remains, that our model appears to perform slightly
better in the shorter period.
Turning now to the actual test for cointegration by scruti-
nising the results of the residuals regression leads to the
conclusion that according to the Dickey-Fuller test {Table
3) the null of no cointegration can be rejected at the 10
per cent level in favour of the hypothesis of stochastic co-
integration for the 1915 - 1978 estimate but not for the
1915 - 1988 estimate. Although we seem to meet again the
problem of "near observational equivalence" between cointe-
gration and no cointegration, which we already met in the
section on the unit root test, the wrong signs detected in
the static regression constitute strong evidence in favour- 17 -


































































dependent variable: In GDP;
dependent variable: first difference of residuals from
the static regression; independent variable: lagged re-
siduals; no deterministic terms are included in the re-
siduals regression;
static regression: T = 64; residuals regression: T = 63;
static regression: T = 74; residuals regression: T = 73;
critical values for the Dickey-Fuller statistic:
-5.0282 (5 per cent) and -4.7311 (10 per cent) [Phillips,
Ouliaris 1990] ;
approximate range of indifference for the DW statistic:
R = 0.397 (0.347), R = 1.352 (1.187) for T = 64 (74)
(interpolated) at the 5 per cent significance level [Sar-
gan, Bhargava 1983].
**significant at the 1 per cent level;
5 per cent level
* significant at the
Source: Own calculations.- 18 -
of the null hypothesis. We base our discrimination between
cointegration and no cointegraton on traditional time series
analysis by inspecting the sample autocorrelation function
of the residuals from the static regression as shown in
Table 4. Following the Box-Pierce Q statistic, the standard
error (both at lag 20) and casual observation of the esti-
mated function we conclude that the residuals are 1(1).
Since stationarity of the residuals can be achieved only by
first differencing them, we cannot reject the null of no co-
integration.
4. Model Estimation
Having gathered evidence that our model consists of differ-
ence-stationary time series which are not cointegrated, es-
timation should be done with differenced variables; CPI, the
only 1(2) series in our model, sould be differenced twice,
the others only once. The results from a simple OLS regres-
sion (Table 5) indicate that the model performs best in the
period 1915 - 1978 (all signs are correct, the coefficients
are highly significant, and the null of serial correlation
of residuals can be rejected). A specification including
lags for AST and CPI achieves the best fit. However, neither
RWP, the variable representing the conflict between entre-
preneurs and trade unions, nor MX/GDP, the trade variable,
are significant. Dropping both leads to a marginally higher
R as well as to marginally higher t-ratios. We conclude
that the distributional conflicts hypothesis and the infla-
tion hypothesis contribute to explain Argentine growth in
the period 1915 - 1978. A regime change in the 1980s leading
to coefficient instability indicates that our specification
is incorrect for the period 1915 - 1988.- 19 -
Table 4 - Autocorrelation Estimates
Regression
for the Residuals of the Cointegrating































































































































































u.: original time series; du.: once differenced series; d u.: twice differenced series;
Q-Statistic (Box-Pierce) at lag 20; S. E.: standard error of autocorrelation estimate
at lag 20; critical values for the Chi-square distributed Q-Statistic at the 5 and 10
per cent significance level: 31.41 and 28.41 [Pindyck, Rubijifeld 1991].
Source: Own calculations.- 20 -
Table 5 - OLS Estimate of the Model in Differences
5 Variable Model 3 Variable Model
1915-1988 1915-1978 1915-1988 1915-1978










































































































































** significant at the 1 per cent level; * significant at the 5 per cent level;
calculated using TSP.386 version 4.2 A.
Source: Own calculations.- 21 -
IV. Final Remarks
In this paper we revisited three hypotheses, which we had
proposed before, in an attempt to explain the long-run pat-
tern of Argentine real GDP growth: (i) distributional con-
flicts, (ii) a permissive monetary policy, and (iii) the de-
linking of the Argentine economy from the world markets. Ap-
plying unit root econometrics we find evidence that our
series are difference-stationary but not cointegrated. We
thus estimate a model in differences and conclude that hypo-
theses (i) and (ii) contribute to explain the Argentine
growth pattern in the period 1915 - 1978. However, the re-
sults for the extended period 1915 - 1988 indicate that our
model does not perform well in explaining the 1980s, when
substantial changes in economic policy took place in Argen-
tina .
Argentina's poor economic performance appears to be related
to economic policies aiming at boosting domestic demand with
expansionary fiscal policies, accomodated by a loose mone-
tary policy. Foreign trade does not seem to have had any im-
pact on GDP in the period studied. Moreover, the private
sector seems to have been crowded out, with the government
becoming the main player in the economy. This policy and in-
stitutional mix can be associated with the stagnation-cum-
inflation experienced by this country over many decades. To
the extent that our results qualify as a basis for policy
conclusions, a recovery programme for Argentina seems to
call for a privatisation of state enterprises and a restric-
tive monetary policy. The long-run decline of the economy in
the framework of an excessive import-substitution strategy
could indicate that a reintegration into the international
division of labour could constitute an additional source of
growth by expanding the level of demand faced by Argentine
firms.- 22 -
By selling off state firms, the government could reduce its
role in the production of private goods and services and
focus on the production of genuine public goods. By stabi-
lising the economy the government could create the basic
incentives needed for the private sector to increase invest-
ment. Argentine capital transitorily parked abroad and new
foreign capital (and technology) could flow in if Argentina
would again become an attractive location for economic ac-
tivity. Accumulated foreign debt could then be easily paid
off.
If these elements of a growth-enhancing strategy are con-
trasted with the economic programme currently (1991/92) im-
plemented by the Argentine government, consisting of priva-
tisation, fiscal discipline and lower tariff and non-tariff
barriers, we agree with "The Economist" [19 October 1991]
that Argentina seems to have rejected at least some of its
"old ways". However, current economic policy is not only too
vague on fiscal and monetary policy but also includes a
fixed exchange rate of the Argentine currency vis-a-vis the
US dollar (fixed by public law). The outcome is that infla-
tion, although receding, is still high and that the domestic
currency remains overvalued, as it has been during most of
this century. This means that import demand for tradables is
bound to stay high, that the competitiveness of Argentine
exports could decrease further, and that Argentina could re-
main a bad choice for local and foreign investors. An ef-
fective stabilisation programme would demand further cuts in
public spending, a much slower monetary expansion and, most
importantly for foreign trade and voluntary capital inflows
to resume, a freely floating exchange rate; convertibility
of the domestic currency should eventually follow.
Are there any lessons from the Argentine case study that
could be useful for the former COMECON countries? In spite
of the major ideological and institutional differences ex-- 23 -
isting between Argentina and the formerly communist coun-
tries, it is certainly not surprising to find that the lat-
ter have to cope, in part, with very similar problems. Pri-
vatisation is a need for Argentina as it also is for the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe including the former
USSR. The same applies to price stabilisation and converti-
bility of the domestic currency. One lesson that could be
derived from the Argentine experience is that the former
COMECON countries should be very careful with distributional
conflicts: the transformation of a socialist economy into a
market economy is a savings-intensive process with little
room for prodigality. It will only be possible to close the
probable savings-gap resorting to the international capital
market if attractive conditions are established, i.e. if
distributional conflicts are solved by negotiating shares in
the achieved income, instead of distributing unearned wealth
by artificially expanding the money supply and fuelling in-
flation.- 24 -
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Q (20) 693.00 25.10 51.40


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































y.: original time series; dy. : once differenced series; d y.: twice
differenced series; Q-Statisfic (Box-Pierce) at lag 20; S. E.: standard
error of autocorrelation estimate at lag 20; critical values for the
Chi-square distributed Q-Statistic at the 5 and 10 per cent signifi-
cance level: 31.41 and 28.41 [Pindyck, Rubinfeld 1991].
Source: Own calculations.- 32 -
Table A2 Test for First and Second Order Integration of Real Gross

















































































1: constant only; 2: constant and linear trend; 3: constant and qua-
dratic trend; 4: constant and cubic trend; 5: constant and trend terms
from t to t ; 6: constant and trend terms from t to t ; a: no lagged
dependent variable present; b: dependent variable lagged once; c: de-
pendent variable lagged once and twice; critical values for the Dickey-
Fuller statistic at the 5 and 10 per cent significance level: 1: -2.91
and -2.59; 2: -3.48 and -3.17 [Fuller 1976].
Source: Own calculations.- 33 -
Table A3 - Test for First and Second Order Integration of Real Gross






































































1: constant only; 2: constant and linear trend; 3: constant and qua-
dratic trend; 4: constant and cubic trend; a: no lagged dependent vari-
able present; b: dependent variable lagged once; c: dependent variable
lagged once and twice; critical values for the Dickey-Fuller statistic
at the 5 and 10 per cent significance level: 1: -2.91 and -2.59;
2: -3.48 and -3.17 [Fuller 1976].
Source: Own calculations.- 34 -
Table A4 - Test for First and Second Order Integration of Real





































































1: constant only; 2: constant and linear trend; 3: constant and qua-
dratic trend; 4: constant and cubic trend; a: no lagged dependent vari-
able present; b: dependent variable lagged once; c: dependent variable
lagged once and twice; critical values for the Dickey-Fuller statistic
at the 5 and 10 per cent significance level: 1: -2.91 and -2.59;
2: -3.48 and -3.17 [Fuller 1976].
Source: Own calculations.- 35 -
Table A5 Test for First and Second Order Integration of the In-





































































1: constant only; 2: constant and linear trend; 3: constant and qua-
dratic trend; 4: constant and cubic trend; a: no lagged dependent
variable present; b: dependent variable lagged once; c: dependent
variable lagged once and twice; critical values for the Dickey-Fuller
statistic at the 5 and 10 per cent significance level: 1: -2.91 and
-2.59; 2: -3.48 and -3.17 [Fuller 1976].
Source: Own calculations.- 36 -
Table A6 Test for First and Second Order Integration of the





































































1: constant only; 2: constant and linear trend; 3: constant and qua-
dratic trend; 4: constant and cubic trend; a: no lagged dependent
variable present; b: dependent variable lagged once; c: dependent
variable lagged once and twice; critical values for the Dickey-Fuller
statistic at the 5 and 10 per cent significance level: 1: -2.91 and
-2.59; 2: -3.48 and -3.17 [Fuller 1976].
Source: Own calculations.- 37 -
Table A7 Test for First and Second Order Integration of the


















































































1: constant only; 2: constant and linear trend; 3: constant and qua-
dratic trend; 4: constant and cubic trend; 5: constant and trend terms
from t to t ; 6: constant and trend terms from t to t ; a: no lagged
dependent variable present; b: dependent variable lagged once; c: de-
pendent variable lagged once and twice; critical values for the Dickey-
Fuller statistic at the 5 and 10 per cent significance level: 1: -2.91
and -2.59; 2: -3.48 and -3.17 [Fuller 1976].
Source: Own calculations.- 38 -
Table A8 - Test for First and Second Order Integration of the Real



































































1: constant only; 2: constant and linear trend; 3: constant and qua-
dratic trend; 4: constant and cubic trend; a: no lagged dependent
variable present; b: dependent variable lagged once; c: dependent
variable lagged once and twice; critical values for the Dickey-Fuller
statistic at the 5 and 10 per cent significance level: 1: -2.91 and
-2.59; 2: -3.48 and -3.17 [Fuller 1976].
Source: Own calculations.- 39 -
Table A9 - Test for First and Second Order Integration of Real Pro-





































































1: constant only; 2: constant and linear trend; 3: constant and qua-
dratic trend; 4: constant and cubic trend; a: no lagged dependent
variable present; b: dependent variable lagged once; c: dependent
variable lagged once and twice; critical values for the Dickey-Fuller
statistic at the 5 and 10 per cent significance level: 1: -2.91 and
-2.59; 2: -3.48 and -3.17 [Fuller 1976].
Source: Own calculations.- 40 -
Table A10 - Test for First and Second Order Integration of the Wage






































































1: constant only; 2: constant and linear trend; 3: constant and qua-
dratic trend; 4: constant and cubic trend; a: no lagged dependent
variable present; b: dependent variable lagged once; c: dependent
variable lagged once and twice; critical values for the Dickey-Fuller
statistic at the 5 and 10 per cent significance level: 1: -2.91 and
-2.59; 2: -3.48 and -3.17 [Fuller 1976].
Source: Own calculations.- 41 -
Table All - Test for First and Second Order Integration of Exports





































































1: constant only; 2: constant and linear trend; 3: constant and qua-
dratic trend; 4: constant and cubic trend; a: no lagged dependent
variable present; b: dependent variable lagged once; c: dependent
variable lagged once and twice; critical values for the Dickey-Fuller
statistic at the 5 and 10 per cent significance level: 1: -2.91 and
-2.59; 2: -3.48 and -3.17 [Fuller 1976].
Source: Own calculations.